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This paper develops an oligopolistic model of international trade with het-
erogeneous ﬁrms and endogenous R&D to examine how trade liberalization
aﬀects ﬁrm and industry productivity, as well as social welfare. We identify
four eﬀects of trade liberalization on productivity: (i) a direct eﬀect through
changes in R&D investment; (ii) a scale eﬀect due to changes in ﬁrm size;
(iii) a selection eﬀect due to ineﬃcient ﬁrms leaving the market; and (iv) a
market-share reallocation eﬀect as eﬃcient ﬁrms expand and ineﬃcient ﬁrms
reduce their output. We show how these eﬀects operate in the short run
when market structure is ﬁxed, and in the long run when market structure
is endogenous. Among the robust results that hold for any market structure
are that trade liberalization (i) increases (decreases) aggregate R&D for low
(high) trade costs; (ii) increases expected ﬁrm size if trade costs are high;
and (iii) raises expected social welfare if trade costs are low.
JEL classiﬁcation: F12, F15
Keywords: international trade, ﬁrm heterogeneity, R&D, productivity, mar-
ket structure1 Introduction
How trade liberalization aﬀects the productivity of ﬁrms and industries has
been one of the key questions in both the academic and political debate about
trade policy. The idea, popular in the 1960s and 70s especially among govern-
ments of less-developed countries, that ﬁrms would raise their productivity if
only one protected them from foreign competition, has since been supplanted
by the diametrically opposite view: namely that ﬁrms would increase their
productivity, if they were exposed to foreign competition. Among the popular
arguments oﬀered to support this view are that import competition would
force ﬁrms to become more eﬃcient if they wanted to survive in tougher mar-
kets, or that greater access to foreign markets would expose ﬁrms to foreign
technology and management techniques. This alleged productivity enhan-
cing eﬀect of trade is often portrayed as one of the main reasons why trade
liberalization may raise social welfare.
The purpose of the current paper is to examine more rigorously some of
the possible channels through which trade liberalization might aﬀect ﬁrm and
industry productivity, as well as social welfare. Speciﬁcally we want to study
how trade policy aﬀects the incentives of ﬁrms to invest in cost-reducing
R&D when the outcome of this investment is stochastic. For this purpose we
develop an oligopoly model of international trade, in which we can study the
eﬀects of trade liberalization on R&D, as well as domestic and foreign sales
both for an exogenous and for an endogenous market structure. The case of an
exogenous market structure can be interpreted either as a short-run scenario
or as a model of an industry facing large sunk entry or exit costs. In both
interpretations, ﬁrms adjust to trade liberalization by adjusting domestic
and foreign sales (possibly to zero) and R&D investment, but there is no
entry of new ﬁrms. The case of an endogenous market structure may serve
as a long-run scenario, in which proﬁts are driven to zero by free entry and
exit of ﬁrms. Alternatively, we may interpret this case as representing an
industry in which sunk entry or exit costs are small. Firms may still respond
to trade liberalization by adjusting output and R&D expenditure. However,
1part of the adjustment will be in the form of entry and exit. We are especially
interested in identifying trade liberalization eﬀects that hold across diﬀerent
market structures and can therefore be expected to occur in a wide range of
industries.
Is there any evidence that trade liberalization leads to higher productiv-
ity at the ﬁrm and industry level? The vast empirical literature on the rela-
tionship between trade and productivity oﬀers conﬂicting answers. Some of
the studies seeking a direct link between trade liberalization and ﬁrm pro-
ductivity ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of lower trade barriers on productivity, while
others show no or even a negative eﬀect.1 The only apparently robust result
found by recent empirical studies using ﬁrm- and plant-level data, namely
that there is a positive correlation between the productivity of ﬁrms and
their export-market participation, also oﬀers little help. In particular, while
there is ample evidence to suggest that only the most productive ﬁrms in an
industry become exporters, these studies oﬀer only limited evidence that ex-
porting makes ﬁrms more productive (see Bernard and Jensen, 1999, Tybout,
2003, and Wagner, 2007, for surveys of this literature).
But why should exporting make ﬁrms more productive? What are the
precise channels through which trade policy aﬀects ﬁrm and industry pro-
ductivity? We know from homogeneous-ﬁrm models of monopolistic com-
petition (Krugman, 1979) and reciprocal dumping (Brander and Krugman,
1983) that trade liberalization may raise productivity due to a ﬁrm-scale
eﬀect: ﬁrms become larger, allowing them to spread their ﬁxed costs over
a larger output. Models accounting for ﬁrm heterogeneity, in which ﬁrms
draw their marginal costs from a probability distribution,2 add two addi-
tional positive eﬀects on industry productivity: a selection eﬀect, whereby
1Empirical studies by Treﬂer (2004) and Konings and Vandenbussche (2004) suggest
that trade liberalization has an insigniﬁcant, respectively negative eﬀect on ﬁrm productiv-
ity. Pavcnik (2002), Muendler (2004), Amiti and Konings (2005) and Fernandes (2007) ﬁnd
a positive eﬀect of trade liberalization on ﬁrm productivity. See Ederington and McCalman
(2007) for many additional references.
2See Bernard et al. (2003), Melitz (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2004), Baldwin (2005);
Greenaway and Kneller (2005) provide a recent survey of the literature.
2trade liberalization forces ﬁrms that have drawn a high marginal cost to exit
the market; and a market-share reallocation eﬀect, whereby low-cost ﬁrms
gain market share at the expense of high-cost ﬁrms.
This cannot be the whole story, however, because ﬁrm productivity is
itself endogenous: ﬁrms directly inﬂuence their productivity. In particular,
ﬁrms may take action to lower their costs with a view to becoming exporters.
Self-selection into export markets would then be a result of a "conscious
process" rather than just the result of a lucky draw. That ﬁrms do indeed
pursue strategies to boost their productivity to increase their chances of
entering export markets is suggested by Alvarez and López (2005) and others
who ﬁnd empirical evidence to that eﬀect.3
In the current paper we try to shed new light on the trade policy-
productivity relationship by examining one particular way in which ﬁrms
may inﬂuence their productivity, namely by investing in cost-reducing (i.e.,
process) R&D. We let the outcome of this investment be stochastic in that
a ﬁrm’s marginal production cost is a random variable. An increase in R&D
simply raises the probability of drawing a low marginal cost. This framework
allows us to study a number of interesting questions. First, what eﬀect does
trade liberalization have on R&D investment? This is an important question,
not least because investment in innovation is one of the key determinants of
economic growth. Second, how does the R&D channel interact with other
possible mechanisms through which ﬁrms adapt to a more liberal trading
environment?
We are able to incorporate R&D and ﬁrm heterogeneity in a surprisingly
simple model of international trade. Our model is a variant of the recip-
rocal dumping model (Brander and Krugman, 1983), in which ﬁrms ﬁrst
decide on market entry and investment in R&D to increase the likelihood
of drawing a low marginal cost, then individually learn their marginal cost,
and ﬁnally play a Bayesian Cournot game to determine their domestic and
foreign sales. The model allows us to derive comparative static eﬀects of a
3See also Hallward-Driermeier et al. (2002), and Emami-Namini and Lopez (2006).
3reduction in trade costs on R&D, domestic output, exports, mark-ups, crit-
ical values of marginal cost below which ﬁrm sell domestically and below
which they export. Moreover, we are able to determine how trade liberaliz-
ation aﬀects aggregate industry productivity and social welfare, both under
an exogenous and an endogenous market structure. We are able to prove the
following robust results that hold independent of market structure: trade lib-
eralization (i) raises (reduces) aggregate R&D spending if trade costs are low
(high); (ii) raises expected exports and, provided that trade costs are high,
reduces expected local sales; (iii) increases expected ﬁrm size provided that
trade costs are high; (iv) forces the least eﬃcient ﬁrms to exit the market;
(v) leads to a reallocation of market share from less to more eﬃcient ﬁrms;
and (v) raises social welfare if trade costs are suﬃciently low. The eﬀect of
trade liberalization on productivity generally depends on market structure.
However, we are able to derive suﬃcient conditions under which this eﬀect
is positive: ﬁrst, trade liberalization raises productivity under a ﬁxed market
structure, if trade costs are suﬃciently low; second, a reduction in trade costs
raises productivity under an endogenous market structure if these costs are
suﬃciently high.
Our paper contributes to at least two strands of literature. First, it ex-
tends the already mentioned literature on trade with heterogeneous ﬁrms. In
addition to introducing R&D and thereby endogenizing ﬁrm productivity, our
paper oﬀers a novel approach to modelling ﬁrm heterogeneity. In particular,
we allow ﬁrms to interact strategically in an oligopolistic market instead of
relying on monopolistic competition. An important beneﬁt of our approach
is that it explicitly reproduces output and mark-up adjustments by ﬁrms
that are among the most robust empirical regularities of international trade,
but are typically absent in monopolistic competition models (see Melitz and
Ottaviano, 2004, for an exception).
Second, the paper is directly related to several papers that explicitly ex-
amine the link between trade policy and innovation activity. Navas and Sala
(2006) introduce process innovation into the Melitz (2003) models by adding
4another type of ﬁrm, namely an exporter/innovator. However, in the open-
economy version of their paper the amount of innovation investment is held
constant. Ederington and McCalman (2007) study the eﬀect of trade liberal-
ization on the incentives of ﬁrms to adopt a more productive foreign techno-
logy. They show both in a theoretical model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and in
an empirical study of Colombian ﬁrms that the eﬀect of trade policy on the
speed of technology adoption depends on ﬁrm and industry-speciﬁc factors.
Miyagiwa and Ohno (1995) also examine the impact of trade policy on the
speed of technology adoption, and ﬁnd that it depends on the type of trade
policy used. Atkeson and Burstein (2006) develop a dynamic general equi-
librium model in which ﬁrms may invest "managerial time" to improve their
technology. Their main result is that a marginal decrease in trade costs has
no eﬀect on ﬁrms’ incentives to innovate. Gustafson and Segerstrom (2006)
provide a version of the Melitz (2003) model in which R&D is carried out in
an innovation sector that uses labor to develop new product varieties. The
eﬀect of trade liberalization on productivity, economic growth and ultimately
welfare is shown to depend crucially on the presence of intertemporal know-
ledge spillovers in the innovation sector. Pires (2006) uses an oligopoly model
to examine how diﬀerences in country size lead to cross-country diﬀerences
in R&D investment and hence serve as a basis for international specializa-
tion in production. Funk (2003) examines empirically how R&D spending
by ﬁrms adjusts to exchange-rate movements, showing that purely domestic
ﬁrms react diﬀerently than ﬁrms that export.4
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model. Section 3 contains the results both in the case of a ﬁxed mar-
ket structure and in the case of an endogenous market structure. Section 4
concludes. The Appendix contains proofs.
4There is also a sizeable literature on the link between strategic R&D and trade policy
in oligopolistic markets. See, for instance, Bagwell and Staiger (1994). Haaland and Kind
(2004) employ a model in which R&D and output are determined simultaneously, after
the government has set R&D subsidies.
52 The Model
We consider an oligopolistic trade model with two segmented markets: the
home and the foreign market. The oligopolists produce a homogeneous good.
Consumers in each market have quadratic quasi-linear preferences over this
good (and a numeraire good) that give rise to a linear inverse demand func-
tion,
pj = A − Qj, (1)
where pj and Qj denote price and total sales in market j. Labor is the only
factor of production and comes in ﬁxed supply. Assuming that the numeraire
good is produced under constant returns to scale at unit cost and traded
freely on a competitive world market, the equilibrium wage in each country
is equal to one, and trade is always balanced.
Let n denote the number of active oligopolists in each market. Firms in the
oligopoly industry produce under constant (but ex-ante unknown) marginal
cost c (equal to the unit labor requirement). We assume that the marginal
cost is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and is revealed to the ﬁrm (as private information) only
after it has incurred a set-up cost f > 0. The probability that a ﬁrm’s
marginal cost is less than or equal to c is given by the ex-ante cumulative
distribution F(c); the support of the density function f(c) is the interval
[0,  c]. The per-unit trade cost on shipments between countries is denoted by
t.
A ﬁrm may invest an amount r ≥ 0 in R&D to increase its chances to
become a lower-cost ﬁrm. Let G(c) denote the corresponding after-R&D cu-
mulative probability distribution. We assume R&D increases this probability
such that
G(c) = g(r)F(c),g(0) = 1,g
′ > 0,g
′′ ≤ 0. (2)
Obviously, expression (2) holds true only as long as G(c) ≤ 1.5 The cost of
R&D is given by
5Precisely, G(c) = min(g(r)F(c),1).
6ρ(r) : ρ(0) = 0,ρ
′ > 0,ρ
′′ ≥ 0. (3)
Consider home ﬁrm i. It has incurred the entry cost f and the R&D cost
ρ(r). Upon learning its cost ci, its output decision will be y(ci) for the home
market and x(ci) for the foreign market. This output decision will depend on
the expected output of all rival ﬁrms. Note that output decisions have to be
made under asymmetric information as marginal costs will be revealed only
to the individual ﬁrm and individual output decisions have to be based on
expectations about the rivals’ output. The home ﬁrm will face n−1 domestic
rivals, each expected to produce and sell   y units in the home market, and n
foreign rivals, each expected to sell   x∗ units in the home market. Deﬁne
Q−i ≡ (n − 1)  y + n  x
∗.
The home ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order condition for its domestic sales y(ci) is
p(y(ci) + Q−i) + y(ci)p
′(y(ci) + Q−i) − ci ≤ 0,(= 0 if y(ci) > 0) (4)
Let us deﬁne the critical marginal cost for which y(ci) becomes zero:
  cy ≡ A − (n − 1)  y − n  x
∗. (5)
Then the ﬁrst-order conditions give rise to the decision rule6
y(ci) =
 
0 if ci ≥   cy,
1
2 (  cy − ci) if ci <   cy, (6)
and the proﬁt in the home market is equal to
π(ci) =
 
0 if ci ≥   cy,
1
4 (  cy − ci)
2 if ci <   cy.
(7)
Similarly in the foreign market, the home ﬁrm faces n foreign rivals, each
supplying   y∗ units, and n − 1 domestic rivals, each exporting   x units. Firm






−i) − t − ci ≤ 0, (= 0 if x(ci) > 0), (8)




−i ≡ n  y
∗ + (n − 1)  x.
The critical marginal cost for which x(ci) becomes zero is given by:
  cx ≡ A − (n − 1)  x − n  y
∗ − t. (9)
Hence the quantity of exports is
x(ci) =
 
0 if ci ≥   cx,
1
2 (  cx − ci) if ci <   cx, (10)




0 if ci ≥   cx,
1
4 (  cx − ci)
2 if ci <   cx.
(11)
Prior to learning its marginal cost, the home ﬁrm forms expectations
about its sales levels. This expectation coincides with the expected sales
levels of all rivals. In what follows, we set   y∗ =   y and   x∗ =   x, because the
two countries are identical. The following Lemma shows that the expected
local and export sales of a ﬁrm are determined by a system of only two
equations:
Lemma 1 Expected sales are
  y =
g(r)
2
  ￿ cy
0
F(c)dc, (12)
  x =
g(r)
2
  ￿ cx
0
F(c)dc. (13)
Proof: See Appendix A.1. ￿
Using (7) and (11) we may write the total expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm as
  Π =
g(r)
4
  − (f + ρ(r)), (14)
where
  ≡
  A−(n−1)￿ y−n￿ x
0
[A − (n − 1)  y − n  x − c]
2 dF(c) +
  A−(n−1)￿ x−n￿ y−t
0
[A − (n − 1)  x − n  y − t − c]
2 dF(c). (15)
8Prior to learning its marginal cost, each entrant chooses its R&D level








′(r) = 0. (16)
We assume that   Πrr ≡ g′′(r)  − 4ρ′(r) < 0. For future convenience, let us
denote the optimal level of R&D by   r, where
g
′(  r)  − 4ρ
′(  r) = 0. (17)
The following assumption guarantees that   r > 0, i.e., that the optimal R&D
level is non-zero:
Assumption 1
  > 4ρ
′(0).
3 The Eﬀects of Trade Liberalization
In this section we examine how trade liberalization in the form of a marginal
reduction in t aﬀects the equilibrium of the model. We start with the case
of a ﬁxed market structure. That is, we determine how trade liberalization
aﬀects expected local sales, expected exports and R&D, holding ﬁxed the
number of ﬁrms. One may interpret this as a short-run scenario, in which the
number of ﬁrms has not yet had time to adjust. We then turn to the case
of endogenous market structure, where market entry and exit occur until
expected proﬁts are equal to zero. In this case we want to know how trade
liberalization aﬀects expected local sales, expected exports, R&D, as well as
the equilibrium number of ﬁrms.
3.1 Fixed Market Structure
In the case of a ﬁxed market structure the equilibrium   y,   x and   r are de-
termined by equations (12), (13) and (17). To derive the comparative static
eﬀects of a reduction in t we totally diﬀerentiate these equilibrium conditions.
9A formal analysis is presented in Appendix A.2. Here we want to focus on
building intuition for the results. For this purpose it is useful to ﬁrst consider
the eﬀect of trade liberalization on the threshold values of the marginal cost,
  cy and   cx. For t = 0 we obviously have   cy =   cx: there is only one critical
value such that ﬁrms with marginal cost draws below this value are active on
the integrated home and foreign markets, whereas ﬁrms with higher marginal
costs do not produce any output. For t > 0, we must have   cy >   cx: only the
most eﬃcient ﬁrms export, whereas ﬁrms with cost draws between   cy and   cx
only sell on the domestic market. To see how   cy and   cx change with t, we can
use (5) and (9) to obtain:
d  cy
dt
















We can prove the following result:
Proposition 1 If the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed,
d￿ cy
dt > 0 and d￿ cx
dt < 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.2. ￿
This result implies that as trade costs decline, the threshold cost level   cx
becomes higher, so that ﬁrms with marginal cost draws just above the old
export threshold level will now be able to export. On the other hand, the
threshold cost level   cy falls, meaning that ﬁrms that were just eﬃcient enough
to sell on their local market are now forced to exit the market altogether.
We are now able to explain the following comparative static results:
Proposition 2 If the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed, trade liberalization (i) in-
creases expected exports; (ii) decreases expected local sales if trade costs are
high, and has an ambiguous eﬀect on local sales if trade costs are low; (iii)
increases the expected total output of each ﬁrm; and (iv) increases (decreases)
R&D if trade costs are low (high).
Proof: see Appendix A.2. ￿
10Consider ﬁrst how trade liberalization aﬀects a ﬁrm’s expected sales hold-
ing ﬁxed the level of R&D expenditure. Expected export sales rise, since
trade liberalization raises the probability that any given ﬁrm will be eﬃcient
enough to be able to export (  cx falls), and allows those ﬁrms that do export
to increase their shipments abroad. Expected domestic sales decrease, since
ﬁrms respond to import competition by reducing local sales. In addition, as
  cy rises, the likelihood that a given ﬁrm will be able to sell on its local market
falls. These arguments explain the increase in export sales (part (i) of the
proposition), but not why domestic sales might increase if trade costs are low
(see part (ii)). This ambiguity has to come from changes in R&D spending.
Speciﬁcally, expected domestic sales can only rise after trade liberalization,
if increased R&D leads to a big enough downward shift in the marginal cost
distribution. The eﬀect of trade liberalization on total sales of a ﬁrm is un-
ambiguously positive (part (iii)), as the expected increase in exports more
than compensates even an expected decrease in domestic sales.
How does R&D respond to a reduction in trade costs? A ﬁrm selling
only on the domestic market would want to reduce its R&D spending, since
tougher import decreases its output and hence also the marginal beneﬁt
from R&D. An exporter would want to increase R&D, since the increase in
its export sales more than compensates the decrease in local market share,
meaning that it has a greater incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&D. If t is
suﬃciently close to the prohibitive level, the probability of being an exporter
is very low (  cx is small), whereas there is a large probability of selling only
on the domestic market (  cy and (  cy −   cx) are big). This implies that for high
trade cost, R&D spending falls as trade is liberalized. If t is close to zero,
almost all active ﬁrms will have access to the export market and therefore
be able to expand output as trade is liberalized. Hence for low trade costs,
R&Dspending increases with trade liberalization. This explains the U-shaped
relationship between trade costs and R&D in part (iv).
Propositions 1 and 2 indicate that trade liberalization has four eﬀects on
industry productivity: (i) a scale eﬀect: as ﬁrm size increases the ﬁxed cost
11is spread over higher expected output; (ii) a selection eﬀect: the least eﬃ-
cient ﬁrms exit; (iii) a market-share reallocation eﬀect: more eﬃcient ﬁrms
gain access to the export market and raise their output at the expense of
less eﬃcient ﬁrms; and (iv) a direct eﬀect due to changes in R&D invest-
ment. Trade liberalization induces greater R&D spending and hence has an
unambiguously positive eﬀect on industry productivity when trade costs are
low.
Finally, consider how trade liberalization aﬀects consumer surplus and
social welfare. Since expected output increases with trade liberalization, it
follows that consumer surplus must rise. To determine how social welfare is
aﬀected, we have to take into account the change in the domestic ﬁrms’ ex-
pected proﬁts. If t is close enough to zero, the usual pro-competitive eﬀect of
trade liberalization dominates, meaning that the increase in consumer sur-
plus caused by tougher competition more than compensates for the decline
in industry proﬁt. If t is near the prohibitive level, this pro-competitive ef-
fect may be oﬀset by the fact that exporters have to bear high trade costs
so that proﬁts fall by more than consumer surplus rises. These eﬀects are
similar to those in the reciprocal dumping model. However, in our model the
welfare eﬀect of trade liberalization may be positive for close to prohibitive
trade costs. The reason for this is that as trade costs are lowered from the
prohibitive level only the most eﬃcient ﬁrms are able to export, whereas the
least eﬃcient active ﬁrms are forced to exit the market. In other words, the
selection eﬀect of trade liberalization provides an additional boost to pro-
ductivity and hence welfare that is not present in the conventional reciprocal
dumping model. The following Proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 3 If the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed, trade liberalization raises
(i) industry productivity, if the trade cost is suﬃciently low; (ii) expected
consumer surplus; and (iii) expected social welfare provided that the trade
cost is suﬃciently low.
Proof: see Appendix A.2. ￿
123.2 Endogenous Market Structure
Now consider the case of an endogenous market structure. Free entry and












ρ(  r) + f
. (20)
Expression (20) clearly shows that the optimal R&D level per ﬁrm depends
only on g and ρ. This has the following consequence:
Proposition 4 Firm-level R&D does not depend on trade costs if market
structure is endogenous.
According to Proposition 4, ﬁrm entry and exit eliminates any eﬀect of
trade liberalization on R&D per ﬁrm. This does not, however, mean that
trade liberalization has no eﬀect on aggregate R&D, since the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms may change. To determine the eﬀects of trade liberalization,
we may treat R&D expenditures as a ﬁxed cost and use equations (12), (13)
and (19) to solve for the remaining endogenous variables (n,  x,   y). We may
rewrite these equations as
2  y −
  A−(n−1)￿ y−n￿ x
0
G(c)dc = 0, (21)
2  x −
  A−(n−1)￿ x−n￿ y−t
0
G(c)dc = 0, (22)
  A−(n−1)￿ y−n￿ x
0
[A − (n − 1)  y − n  x − c]
2 dG(c) + (23)
  A−(n−1)￿ x−n￿ y−t
0
[A − (n − 1)  x − n  y − t − c]
2 dG(c) − 4(f + ρ(r
∗)) = 0.
13Before turning to the comparative static eﬀects of trade liberalization, let
us verify that the selection eﬀect operates in the same way as under a ﬁxed
market structure. We obviously still have   cy =   cx for t = 0, and   cy >   cx for
t > 0. In the derivatives of   cy and   cx with respect to t we obtain an additional
eﬀect, since the number of ﬁrms changes:
d  cy
dt






















Still we can prove that the selection eﬀect is equivalent to the one in the
ﬁxed market structure case. That is, trade liberalization eliminates the least
eﬃcient ﬁrms from the domestic market, whereas more eﬃcient ﬁrms are able
to export.
Proposition 5 If the number of ﬁrms is endogenous,
d￿ cy
dt > 0 and d￿ cx
dt < 0.
Proof: see Appendix A.3. ￿
Total diﬀerentiation of (21), (22) and (23) yields the following comparat-
ive static results:
Proposition 6 If market structure is endogenous, trade liberalization (i) in-
creases expected exports and decreases expected home production of each ﬁrm;
(ii) increases the expected output of each ﬁrm if trade costs are high; and (iii)
increases (decreases) the number of ﬁrms and hence aggregate R&D if trade
costs are low (high).
Proof: see Appendix A.3. ￿
To gain intuition for part (i) recall that with a ﬁxed market structure
the eﬀect of trade liberalization on local sales was ambiguous for low trade
costs, because trade liberalization induced ﬁrms to raise their R&D spending.
Since this eﬀect is absent here, the impact of trade liberalization is straight-
forward: the probability that a given ﬁrm exports rises as do sales of each
exporting ﬁrm abroad. Increased competition from abroad reduces local sales,
14as does the selection eﬀect. The intuition for parts (ii) and (iii) is straightfor-
ward when trade costs are high. Trade liberalization increases competition
and hence makes each ﬁrm’s residual demand more elastic. Firms hence are
forced to raise their output to make up on volume what they lose on price so
that the expected proﬁt remains zero. As a result, the number of ﬁrms has to
fall. For low trade costs, we observe a diﬀerent eﬀect. Consider an inﬁnites-
imal increase in the trade cost starting at free trade. This leaves output of
the ﬁrm unchanged. However, since ﬁrms now have to pay a transportation
cost, expected proﬁt has to fall and the number of ﬁrms has to decrease so
as to keep expected proﬁt equal to zero. Hence at free trade, and by con-
tinuity suﬃciently close to it, trade liberalization will raise the number of
ﬁrms and therefore also industry-level R&D. A suﬃcient condition for the
number of ﬁrms to increase with trade liberalization is states in the following
Proposition:
Proposition 7 If the expected output of each ﬁrm decreases with trade lib-
eralization, the number of ﬁrms will increase.
Proof: see Appendix A.3. ￿
Finally consider the eﬀects of trade liberalization on industry productivity
and social welfare. The selection and market-share reallocation eﬀects, ceteris
paribus, unambiguously raise industry productivity when trade is liberalized.
The scale eﬀect goes in the same direction provided that trade costs are
high, since in this case we obtain fewer but larger ﬁrms. Since R&D per ﬁrm
remains unchanged, trade liberalization hence raises industry productivity at
least for high trade costs.
The eﬀect of trade liberalization on social welfare is equal to the eﬀect on
consumer surplus, since expected proﬁts are zero due to free entry. We are
able to prove that welfare unambiguously increases with trade liberalization.
These results are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 8 If market structure is endogenous, trade liberalization raises
(i) expected social welfare; and (ii) industry productivity provided that trade
costs are high.
15Proof: see Appendix A.3. ￿
4 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a model of international trade with oligopol-
istic competition to explore the eﬀects of trade liberalization on R&D, ﬁrm
and industry productivity, production patterns and social welfare. We were
able to identify a number of robust results concerning the eﬀects of trade
liberalization–robust in the sense that we can identify suﬃcient conditions
under which these results hold for both ﬁxed and endogenous market struc-
tures and hence should be observed across diﬀerent industries independent
of whether their entry cost is large or small. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that trade
liberalization (i) raises (reduces) aggregate R&D spending if trade costs are
low (high); (ii) raises expected exports, and lowers ﬁrms’ local sales if trade
costs are high; (iii) increases expected ﬁrm size provided that trade costs are
high; (iv) forces the least eﬃcient ﬁrms to leave the market; (v) reallocates
market share from less to more eﬃcient ﬁrms; and (vi) raises expected social
welfare if trade costs are suﬃciently low. The productivity eﬀect of trade
liberalization is shown to depend on market structure. If there is no entry
of ﬁrms, a suﬃcient condition for trade liberalization to increase industry
productivity and welfare is that trade costs are low. However, if ﬁrms ad-
just to trade liberalization through entry and exit, a suﬃcient condition for
productivity to increase is that trade costs are high.
The dependency of productivity eﬀects on market structure may explain
the fact, mentioned in the Introduction, that empirical studies come to such
conﬂicting conclusions about the link between trade policy and productivity.
In particular, our paper suggests that one should control for both market
structure and the level of protection when analyzing this link. Similarly,
our paper suggests that the scale eﬀect that ﬁgures prominently in older
studies of trade liberalization (see, for instance, Cox and Harris, 1985) will
not necessarily be observed, especially in industries in which entry and exit
costs are low. This provides a potential explanation why empirical studies
16of trade liberalization seem to fail to ﬁnd a scale eﬀect (see Head and Ries,
1999).
Our model also makes a methodological contribution to the literature.
Speciﬁcally it shows how one can model ﬁrm heterogeneity in a simple way
without resorting to the assumption of monopolistic competition, and how
one can endogenize ﬁrm productivity by allowing for R&D. This approach
has the advantage that it matches quite well the key stylized facts of trade lib-
eralization summarized by Tybout (2003) and Wagner (2007). In particular,
it reproduces the stylized facts that trade liberalization (i) reduces price-
cost margins; (ii) lowers domestic sales of import-competing ﬁrms (at least
provided that trade costs are high, or market structure is endogenous); (iii)
expands markets for very eﬃcient ﬁrms; (iv) increases eﬃciency at the plant
level (at least for low trade costs, or endogenous market structure). In addi-
tion, (v) exporters tend to be larger and more productive than ﬁrms that do
not export.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Expected output for the home market is
E [y(c)] =   y = g(r)





  ￿ cy
0
[  cy − c]dF(c) (A.1)
and expected exports to the foreign market are
E [x(c)] =   x = g(r)





  ￿ cx
0
[  cx − c]dF(c). (A.2)
17Evaluating the integral on the right-hand side of (A.1) by parts, and deﬁning
φ(c) ≡ [  cy − c], we have
  ￿ cy
0
[  cy − c]dF(c) =




= [φ(  cy)F(  cy) − φ(0)F(0)] −





  ￿ cy
0
F(c)dc,
because φ(  cy) = F(0) = 0 and φ
′(c) = −1. A similar derivation leads to the
expected export level. ￿
A.2 Proofs of Propositions 1 to 3






























, α22 ≡ 2 + g(n − 1)F(  cx), α23 ≡ gnF(  cx),
α31 ≡   Πrr, α32 = −
4g′
g
((n − 1)  x + n  y), α33 = −
4g′
g
((n − 1)  y + n  x),










2[(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1] +   y
2[(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cx)) − 1] + 4n  x  y
 






2F(  cx)F(  cy) − (2 + g(n − 1)F(  cy))(2 + g(n − 1)F(  cx))
 
      
≡∆2
We ﬁrst establish that ∆ > 0. Since gnF(  cx) < 2 + g(n − 1)F(  cx) and
gnF(  cy) < 2 + g(n − 1)F(  cy), ∆2 < 0 and hence   Πrr∆2 > 0. Thus, ∆ > 0
18will hold true if we can show that ∆1 > 0. We will show that ∆1 > 0 by
contradiction. We observe ﬁrst that ∆1 > 0 if (2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1 ≥ 0
and (2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cx)) − 1 ≥ 0. Thus, ∆1 < 0 requires that (2n − 1)(1 −
gF(  cy))−1 < 0 and/or (2n−1)(1−gF(  cx))−1 < 0. Since gF(  cy) ≥ gF(  cx),
(2n−1)(1−gF(  cx))−1 ≥ (2n−1)(1−gF(  cy))−1, and we have to consider
two possible cases:
Case 1: (2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cx)) − 1 > 0,(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1 < 0
In this case,
∆1 >   x
2[(2n−1)(1−gF(  cy))−1]+4n  x  y =   x(  x[(2n−1)(1−gF(  cy))−1]+4n  y) > 0
because   y >   x and 4n > −(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) + 1.
Case 2: (2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cx)) − 1 < 0,(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1 < 0
First observe that for zero trade costs,   x =   y, F(  cx) = F(  cy) and
∆1 = 2  y
2(2n − 1)(2 − gF(  cy)) > 0
Hence, ∆1 < 0 warrants the existence of a critical   x <   y such that
  x
2[(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1] +   y
2[(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cx)) − 1] + 4n  x  y = 0.
Solving for quadratic equation yields the two solutions
  x1,2 =
−4n  y ±
 
8n2  y2 − 4[(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1][(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cx)) − 1]  y2
(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1
Note carefully that (2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1 ∈ [−1,0] so that   x is larger
than the numerator in absolute terms. The negative solution is irrelevant as
it implied   x > 4n  y which violates   x <   y. The positive solution fulﬁlls   x <   y
only if
 
8n2  y2 − 4[(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1][(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cx)) − 1]  y2
> (4n − 1)  y.
19However,
 
8n2  y2 − 4[(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cy)) − 1][(2n − 1)(1 − gF(  cx)) − 1]  y2
<
 
8n2  y2 = 2
√
2n  y < (4n − 1)  y,
so that no solution exists in the relevant range and ∆1 > 0 holds also for
that case. This proves that ∆ > 0.






(gn(  yF(  cx) −   xF(  cy)) −   x(2 − gF(  cy))),
dr
dt
< 0 at t = 0 ⇔   x =   y ⇔ F(  cx) = F(  cy),
dr
dt







2(2+g(n−1)F(  cy))+(n  y−  x)g  yF(  cx))+
  Πrr
∆







F(  cx)[(n − 1)g  y






2nF(  cx)F(  cy),
d  y
dt
(  x = 0) =
8g′2
g2∆
(n − 1)g  y




2nF(  cx)F(  cy) > 0,
d  y
dt
(  x =   y) = −2  y







2nF(  cx)F(  cy) is ambiguous.






(2  x  y(1−gF(  cx))−  x




(g(2−gF(  cy))) < 0,







As for the critical values of marginal costs, d  cy/dt can be rewritten as
d  cy
dt















2  Πrr + g
3(n − 1)  ΠrrF(  cy) − 8g
′2  y(n  x + (n − 1)  y)
 
< 0.
20The welfare eﬀect of integration consists of the eﬀect on aggregate expec-

















= −(n − 1)
d  q
dt
  q +
d  y
dt
  x −
d  x
dt
  y −   x,
taking into account that ∂  Π/∂r = 0. Let   CS ≡ (n  q)2/2 denote expected
consumer surplus. Its change with t is



































      
+





For t = 0 ⇔   y =   x ⇔ d  y/dt = d  x/dt, we ﬁnd
d  W
dt







    
−





whereas the marginal welfare eﬀect at the prohibitive trade cost level, i.e.,
for   x = 0, is ambiguous:
d  W
dt


















A.3 Proofs of Propositions 4 to 8























a11 ≡ (  x +   y)G(  cy), a12 ≡ nG(  cy), a13 ≡ 2 + (n − 1)G(  cy),
a21 ≡ (  x +   y)G(  cx), a22 ≡ 2 + (n − 1)G(  cx), a23 ≡ nG(  cx),
a31 ≡ −4(  x +   y)
2, a32 = −4((n − 1)  x + n  y), a33 = −4((n − 1)  y + n  x),
b1 = 0, b2 = −G(  cx), b3 = 4  x.
The determinant is
∆ = 8(  x +   y)[  x(2 − G(  cy)) +   y(2 − G(  cx))] > 0.










< 0 at t = 0 ⇔   x =   y ⇔ G(  cy) = G(  cx),
dn
dt





















= 0 at t = 0 ⇔ x = y ⇔ G(  cy) = G(  cx),
d  q
dt












8  x(  x +   y)(2 − G(  cy))
∆
= −
  x(2 − G(  cy))
  x(2 − G(  cy)) +   y(2 − G(  cy))
< 0.











2(  x +   y) −   xG(  cy) −   yG(  cx)
< 0.
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